• 2025考研復(fù)試伴學(xué)班
• 2025考研復(fù)試標(biāo)準(zhǔn)班
• 2026考研英語(yǔ)全程班
• 26考研全科上岸規(guī)劃營(yíng)「擇校▪規(guī)劃▪備考」
• 北京外國(guó)語(yǔ)大學(xué)2025考研專(zhuān)業(yè)課復(fù)習(xí)資料「真題▪筆記▪講義▪題庫(kù)」

2007年碩士研究生入學(xué)考試英漢同聲傳譯專(zhuān)業(yè)試卷

I. 將下列短文譯成漢語(yǔ)(25分)

After 28 years of reform, China faces challenges of an unprecedented scale, complexity, and importance. China has already liberalized its markets, opened up to foreign trade and investment, and become a global economic powerhouse. Now its leaders and people must deal with popular dissatisfaction with local government, environmental degradation, scarce natural resources, an underdeveloped financial system, an inadequate health-care system, a restless rural population, urbanization on a massive scale, and increasing social inequality. Most of these problems, of course, have existed throughout the period of reform. What is different now is that the pace of change is accelerating while the ability of the state to manage that change is not keeping pace.

Solving any one of these problems by itself would be a formidable task. And the Chinese government today finds it harder than ever to attract, develop, and retain talent. Graduates from the country’s top universities, who once would have filled government posts, are instead choosing to take jobs in the private sector. Moreover, the structure of the country’s bureaucracy stifles initiative and promotes mediocrity. Worse, many officials, from the village to the central government, are corrupt, eroding the government’s effectiveness and feeding popular discontent.

Of all of China’s challenges, none is more critical — or more daunting — than that of nurturing a new generation of leaders who are skilled, honest, committed to public service, and accountable to the Chinese people as a whole.

II. 將下列文章譯成漢語(yǔ) (50分)

The New Middle East

Just over two centuries since Napoleon’s arrival in Egypt heralded the advent of the modern Middle East — some 80 years after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, 50 years after the end of colonialism, and less than 20 years after the end of the Cold War — the American era in the Middle East, the fourth in the region’s modern history, has ended. Visions of a new, Europe-like region–peaceful, prosperous, democratic–will not be realized. Much more likely is the emergence of a new Middle East that will cause great harm to itself, the United States, and the world.

The modern Middle East was born in the late eighteenth century. For some historians, the signal event was the 1774 signing of the treaty that ended the war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia; a stronger case can be made for the importance of Napoleon’s relatively easy entry into Egypt in 1798, which showed Europeans that the region was ripe for conquest and prompted Arab and Muslim intellectuals to ask — as many continue to do today — why their civilization had fallen so far behind that of Christian Europe. Ottoman decline combined with European penetration into the region gave rise to the “Eastern Question,” regarding how to deal with the effects of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, which various parties have tried to answer to their own advantage ever since.

The first era ended with World War I, the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the rise of the Turkish republic, and the division of the spoils of war among the European victors. What ensued was an age of colonial rule, dominated by France and the United Kingdom. This second era ended some four decades later, after another world war had drained the Europeans of much of their strength, Arab nationalism had risen, and the two superpowers had begun to lock horns. “He who rules the Near East rules the world; and he who has interests in the world is bound to concern himself with the Near East,” wrote a historian, who correctly saw the 1956 Suez crisis as marking the end of the colonial era and the beginning of the Cold War era in the region.

III. 將下列短文譯成英語(yǔ)(25分)

中國(guó)特色社會(huì)主義社會(huì)是一個(gè)變革的社會(huì)，是一個(gè)開(kāi)放的社會(huì)，是一個(gè)不斷發(fā)展和完善的社會(huì)。改革開(kāi)放是決定中國(guó)命運(yùn)的重大決策，要貫穿社會(huì)主義社會(huì)發(fā)展的全過(guò)程。只有堅(jiān)持改革開(kāi)放，才能不斷激發(fā)億萬(wàn)人民的積極性和創(chuàng)造性，解放和發(fā)展生產(chǎn)力，永葆社會(huì)主義的生機(jī)與活力。

我們要堅(jiān)定不移地推進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制改革，建立和完善社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)體制，貫徹落實(shí)科學(xué)發(fā)展觀(guān)，促進(jìn)國(guó)民經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)快速健康發(fā)展。同時(shí)，要積極推進(jìn)政治體制改革、文化體制改革和社會(huì)管理體制改革，促進(jìn)社會(huì)主義物質(zhì)文明、政治文明、精神文明與和諧社會(huì)建設(shè)全面協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展。

IV. 將下列文章譯成英語(yǔ)(50分)

在外國(guó)旅行，特別是美國(guó)，最不習(xí)慣的就是處處要付小費(fèi)。說(shuō)是小費(fèi)，數(shù)目對(duì)于我這樣的中國(guó)土鱉來(lái)說(shuō)可不算小，住旅館，每天早上要在枕頭放一兩個(gè)美元，給打掃房間的大姐;吃飯要把餐費(fèi)的10%-20%給服務(wù)員;甚至連坐出租車(chē)也要額外給小費(fèi)，其實(shí)很多出租車(chē)司機(jī)自己都是老板。我特別不能理解，干嗎不直接把價(jià)格提高，算小費(fèi)除了麻煩，而且讓人有額外付出的感覺(jué)，特別像我這樣平時(shí)儉省慣了的人，在中國(guó)自己嗓子冒煙了都舍不得買(mǎi)瓶礦泉水，到了美國(guó)一伸手就得給人付出幾美元，還叫“小費(fèi)”，簡(jiǎn)直讓我心頭淌血。

小費(fèi)大概得算上美國(guó)社會(huì)最重要的“潛規(guī)則”，對(duì)于酒店的門(mén)童、餐館的服務(wù)員，老板有意會(huì)付比較低的工資，小費(fèi)成了他們主要的收入。我曾經(jīng)非常困惑，主要依靠被服務(wù)對(duì)象事后的自覺(jué)，太脆弱了，假如有1/3的人不遵守，這個(gè)游戲就玩不下去了，拿吃飯來(lái)說(shuō)，假如你堅(jiān)持不付小費(fèi)，別人也拿你沒(méi)辦法，大不了下次換個(gè)館子，以免服務(wù)員在你比薩餅里吐口水。

請(qǐng)教了很多人這種規(guī)則何以能維系下去，幾個(gè)美國(guó)人都說(shuō)覺(jué)得付小費(fèi)是很自然的事情，壓根沒(méi)考慮過(guò)這個(gè)問(wèn)題。不過(guò)我聽(tīng)說(shuō)小費(fèi)源于18世紀(jì)的英國(guó)倫敦。那時(shí)，當(dāng)?shù)鼐频甑牟妥郎弦话愣紨[著寫(xiě)有“To Insure Promptness”(保證及時(shí)服務(wù))的碗。顧客坐下后，只要將少量的零錢(qián)放入碗中，就會(huì)得到優(yōu)先服務(wù)，服務(wù)的殷勤程度也和小費(fèi)多少成正比。這一典型的賄賂行為被漸漸發(fā)揚(yáng)光大，而且規(guī)范化、制度化，從事先付款，到誠(chéng)信為本的事后付款，甚至如果你不付得體的小費(fèi)，會(huì)受到道義的譴責(zé)――有一次希拉里沒(méi)給服務(wù)員付小費(fèi)就被媒體批評(píng):那些服務(wù)員收入不高，你不付小費(fèi)他們?cè)趺答B(yǎng)家糊口呀?